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Joe A. Stalcup* and J. McDonald Williams**
I. DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
A NY REVIEW of the developments in property law for the past year
must begin at the federal level. In recent years Congress and the
courts have increasingly sought to recognize and protect personal and
property rights from private as well as public discrimination. The question
of private discrimination in the sale or rental of real property, however,
has received little attention. In Jones v. Mayer' a Negro family sought
injunctive and other relief against a white homeowner who refused to
sell them a home for the sole reason that they were Negroes. At issue
was an obscure federal statute which provides: "All citizens of the United
States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed
by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey
real and personal property."' The United States Supreme Court, declaring
that the statute was a valid exercise of congressional authority to enforce
the thirteenth amendment, held that the statute "bars all racial discrimi-
nation, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property."' Ac-
knowledging that the statute deals only with racial discrimination and
does not speak to discrimination because of religion or national origin, the
Court noted that the case does not preempt the Fair Housing Act4 which
was recently passed by Congress.
The Fair Housing Act has a much broader application than Jones v.
Mayer. Its principal thrust is to make unlawful the refusal to sell or rent,
or the refusal to negotiate as to the sale or rental of, a dwelling to any
person because of race, color, religion or national origin.' However, the
Act also proscribes (1) advertising of the sale or rental of a dwelling that
indicates any preference or discrimination based on race, color, religion or
national origin,6 (2) representing to the prospective purchaser or lessee,
because of his race, color, religion or national origin, that a dwelling is
unavailable for sale or rental, when such dwelling is in fact available,'
and (3) "block busting" for profit.8 Finally, the Act prohibits discrimi-
nation in the financing of housing' and related brokerage services."
*LL.B., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
** LL.B., The George Washington University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
392 U.S. 409 (1968).
242 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964).
3392 U.S. at 413.
442 U.S.C.A. 5§ 3601-3619, 3631 (Supp. 1968).
5id. § 3604(a).
I1d. § 3604(c).
7 id. § 3604(d).
81d. § 3604(e). "Block busting" is inducing a homeowner to sell or rent his dwelling by
making representations about the prospective entry into a neighborhood of persons of a particular
race, color, religion or national origin.
9 1d. 5 3605.
'ld. § 3606.
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There are several exemptions to the coverage of the Act, including a
single-family house sold or rented by its owner provided that (1) the
owner does not own more than three such houses at any one time, (2) if
the owner does not reside in the house, the exemption is available only to
one sale in a two-year period, and (3) the house is sold or rented without
the use of a broker and without advertising the discriminatory policy."
The Act also exempts rooms in dwellings containing living quarters to be
occupied by no more than four families if the owner actually lives in the
dwelling as his residence."2
The Act forges a broad arsenal of remedies for attacking violations.
One remedy is initiated by filing a complaint with the Secretary of Hous-
ing and Urban Development, in which case the Secretary is to investigate
the case and attempt administratively to remedy the violation."3 The Act
also creates a private civil remedy for redressing violations. 4 In the case of
a pattern of resistence to the Act, the Attorney General has authority to
invoke civil proceedings. 5 In sum, the Act and Jones v. Mayer mark a
major extension in protecting civil rights in the crucible of a conflict with
property rights; the protection which began in Shelley v. Kraemer," in
which the Supreme Court held that the courts could not be used to en-
force property restrictions affecting civil rights, has been enlarged to
wage a frontal attack on private discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing.
II. LANDLORD AND TENANT
Retaking Possession Upon Default. Upon default by the tenant, the land-
lord has, among other remedies, the right of re-entry and the right to
take possession of the leased property. Such rights must, however, be
exercised peaceably and without force or violence. But the problem of
advising a landlord as to what measures of self-help may be taken after
the tenant's default is a bit treacherous under Texas law. In Gulf Oil
Corporation v. Smithey, " an oil company leased a service station to its
dealer, agreed to supply him an inventory of gasoline and loaned him
money for the purchase of equipment and merchandise for the operation
of the station, the loan being evidenced by a note secured by a security
agreement covering the equipment and merchandise. The lease agreement
also provided that upon default the landlord could "re-enter and, in any
lawful manner, resume possession of said premises." The security agree-
" Id. § 3603 (b) (1).
1(1d. § 3603 (b) (2).
"Ild. § 3610(a).
141d. § 3612 (a). The remedy includes a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining
order, the award of actual damages and not more than $1,000 in punitive damages, and court
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. Id. § 3612(c).
5 1d. § 3613. He may apply for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order
"or other order against the person or persons responsible for such pattern or practice or denial of
rights, as he deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights granted by this subchapter."
Id.
16 334 U.S. 1 (1958).
17426 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error dismissed.
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ment permitted the secured party to take possession of the collateral and
for such purpose to enter upon the premises and remove the collateral.
Subsequently, the dealer defaulted under the lease and the oil company
locked the station's gasoline pumps and then picked the lock on the service
station in order to remove the equipment and merchandise. The dealer
sued the oil company for damages for trespass and conversion. The court
of civil appeals, acknowledging that the re-entry and repossession rights
of a landlord are valid if exercised peaceably and without force or violence,
held that "entry into the building by picking the lock was not peaceable
but was by force and violence, and that the taking of the personal property
under these circumstances was by force and violence, which is not per-
mitted by the law."18 The court stressed that the dealer was neither pres-
ent during the retaking nor informed that the landlord intended to re-
take possession. This rationale has several difficulties. First, the right of
re-entry and repossession was outlined in the lease and security agreement;
thus, the tenant presumably knew of the landlord's right of re-entry and
repossession. Second, since the lease required no notice of the exercise of
such rights nor the presence of the tenant, these elements seem to be
immaterial in determining whether the re-entry was peaceable. The cen-
tral question is whether the act of picking the lock is peaceable and with-
out violence or force. Certainly, such an act is a forcible entry, but it
presents no violence or threat to the person, unless the tenant returns to
the premises while the landlord is re-entering. Judicial review of the ques-
tion of such a re-entry then should turn on whether the policy to be
emphasized is that of protection of personal rights (e.g., protecting against
the threat of personal violence and injury) or of property rights. The
court in Smithey exalted the protection of property rights, but the cases
cited by the court in support of its decision suggest that the threat of
personal violence is the paramount consideration. 9 In sum, Smitbey further
complicates the landlord's dilemma of whether to attempt to re-enter
after a default. The dilemma is particularly aggravated when the tenant
has abandoned the leased premises and the landlord is concerned about
the security of the premises. In any event, the lesson of this case seems to
be that the landlord should notify the tenant of the intention to re-enter
and retake possession or the tenant must be present.
Repairs. A common practical problem in landlord-tenant relationships
is the responsibility for repairs. The general rule in Texas is that the tenant
18Id. at 265.
'9 Watson v. Hernandez, 374 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), error dismissed (defendant,
in attempting to repossess a car, stopped plaintiff's car, told plaintiff to move over, to hand him
the keys and to get out of the car); Godwin v. Stanley, 331 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959),
error ref. n.r.e. (defendant assaulted plaintiff in repossessing an accordian); Kuhn v. Palo Duro
Corp., 151 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 161 S.W.2d 778 (Tex.
1942) (landlord, brandishing pistol, ordered tenant off premises and began nailing up windows
and doors).
Smithey also raises the related question of whether a landlord who retains a duplicate key
(which is commonly the case) may use the key to re-enter after a default; the landlord's re-




is responsible for repairs unless and to the extent the landlord has expressly
assumed the responsibility. Several cases during the past year added to the
already large corpus of case literature dealing with this problem. In
Perrone v. Kline" a gas leak occurred under the paved parking area of the
leased premises. The tenant viewed the leak as an emergency endanger-
ing the premises and his customers, caused the leak to be repaired, and
sued the landlord for reimbursement. The lease required the landlord to
maintain the roof, foundation and exterior walls of the building and
parking area. The tenant was required to maintain the "interior of the
building, including the plumbing, closets, pipes, and fixtures belonging
thereto ... and . . . [to] take good care of the property and its fixtures."
The court of civil appeals held that the leaking gas pipe was "clearly
within the definition of 'plumbing' and 'pipes and fixtures belonging
thereto,' ".. and the tenant was therefore responsible for the repairs.
In McCrory Corp. v. Nacol' the tenant was sued for personal injuries
resulting from the collapse of the front window of the building; the
tenant sought contribution from the landlord because the lease required
the landlord to maintain the "exterior of the building, including . . .
structural members." The lease also required the tenant to notify the
landlord of any needed repairs and gave the tenant the right to make
such repairs if the landlord failed to do so and to deduct the cost from
future rental installments. The court of civil appeals determined that the
landlord and tenant intended to include the front window as a "structural
member" of the building to be repaired by the landlord. However, the
court iterated the doctrine that when the landlord who has covenanted
to make repairs fails to do so and the tenant fails timely to notify the
landlord of the needed repairs, the duty to make repairs is restored to the
tenant. Thus, the landlord was relieved of any liability for the injury.
III. MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN's LIENS
Retainage and Owner's Liability. Under article 5469, a property owner
is required to retain, until thirty days after construction work is com-
pleted, ten per cent of the "contract price to the owner, his agent, trustee,
or receiver of such work."'" Where the owner directly enters into more
than one contract for the work, the question arises whether article 5469
creates a liability of (1) ten per cent of each separate contract as to laborers
and materialmen under that particular contract, or (2) ten per cent of
the total amount of all of the owner's contracts as to any laborer or ma-
terialman under any of the contracts. In Hunt Developers, Inc. v. Western
Steel Co.,' decided in 1967, the Corpus Christi court of civil appeals held
that the retainage requirement was ten per cent of all contracts with the
20425 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
21 Id. at 373. The court cited as definitional support TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6243-101,
2(a) (1962).
22 428 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. t.re.
2TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5469 (1968).
24409 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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owner for the work. However, in Lennox Industries, Inc. v. Phi Kappa
Sigma Educational & Building Ass'n," the Austin court of civil appeals
held that the retainage requirement applied separately to each contract
with the owner. In Lennox, the owner entered into a general contract for
the construction of an apartment house. The general contract did not
cover air conditioning equipment, among other things, and the owner
entered into a separate contract for the installation of air conditioning
equipment. The installer failed to pay the manufacturer of the equip-
ment, who filed a lien claim. The owner then contracted for the comple-
tion of the installation of air conditioning equipment, and the cost of
completion exceeded the unpaid balance of the original air conditioning
contract. The trial court held that the owner had the right to complete
the work and apply the remaining contract funds to the cost of comple-
tion and that the materialman had no lien claim against the owner. The
court of civil appeals reversed, holding that an owner who does not with-
hold the ten per cent retainage required by article 5469 is nevertheless
liable in such amount to lien claimants. The court further held, however,
that the ten per cent retainage applies only to the contract price of the air
conditioning contract and not to the total of all contracts with the owner.
The court observed that the 1961 amendment to article 5469, changing the
language from "10% of the contract price of such building, fixtures or
improvements" to "10% of the contract price to the owner," when read
together with article 5452 (2) (e), which declares that "there may be one
or more original contractors," clearly requires "that the amount of re-
quired retainage is ...measured by the contract price, one or more, to
the owner.""
The statute does not define the phrase "contract price to the owner,"
and thus the meaning of this phrase is left to judicial construction. The
construction in Hunt prevents an owner with several original contracts
from protecting himself against lien claims in excess of ten per cent of a
particular contract. Under each contract, the owner is required to make
final payment to the contractor thirty days after completion of the work
covered by that contract. The result in Hunt extends the owner's potential
liability for lien claims to thirty days after all the work is completed. By
this time, the owner likely will have paid a substantial portion of the re-
tainages relating to portions of the work previously completed. The
Lennox holding, in addition to reconciling portions of the mechanic's
lien statutes, alleviates this problem.
Priorities. In National Western Life Insurance Co. v. Acreman" the
purchaser of a tract of real property, prior to the time he purchased the
property, entered into a contract with a road contractor for the con-
struction of a road. During the construction period, the property was
conveyed to the purchaser who obtained a land loan and granted a deed
25430 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
26Id. at 408.
"425 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. 1968).
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of trust lien on the property contemporaneously with the conveyance. A
portion of the loan proceeds was withheld by the mortgagee in escrow to
insure the purchaser's performance of the road construction contract. The
purchaser failed to pay the road contractor, who sued on sworn account,
and to establish and foreclose a mechanic's lien as prior to the deed of
trust lien. The road contractor contended that by entering into the
escrow agreement the mortgagee consented to the mechanic's lien and that
such lien was superior to the deed of trust lien. The supreme court dis-
agreed, stating that the mortgagee did not expressly consent to the
mechanic's lien and that, in any event, "mere consent by a lienholder to
creation of a second lien does not make the second lien superior.""
In another case2' a lumber company furnished materials to a construc-
tion company for construction of improvements on city lots, making de-
liveries both before and after a deed of trust securing the construction
loan was filed. The lumber company was not paid and sued for a money
judgment and to establish its lien as prior to the deed of trust lien. Article
54590 provides in part that mechanic's liens have priority over all other
liens except those "on the land or improvements at the time of inception"
of the mechanic's lien. The supreme court, after reviewing the legislative
and judicial history of the mechanic's lien statutes and with three justices
dissenting, concluded that the lumber company's lien had its inception in
the first deliveries of materials to the lots and that the lien should have
priority to the extent of the full value of all materials furnished, whether
before or after the recordation of the deed of trust. Chief Justice Calvert,
the author of the majority opinion, observed that the mechanic's lien
holder "has one lien securing the entire indebtedness as to each lot, not a
series of liens securing separate debts .... The entire lien is made prior or
secondary by the statute."'" Justice Norvell, in dissent, concluded that the
mechanic's lien should be superior only to the extent of the reasonable
value of the materials delivered before the recordation of the deed of
trust."
Removal of Improvements. The courts have formulated the rule that a
mechanic's lien holder may foreclose his lien, despite a prior deed of trust
lien, if the improvements have not become permanently attached to the
property and may be removed without material injury to the property.
In Parkdale State Bank v. McCord" a supplier furnished component parts,
1s Id. at 817.
2 University Sav. & Loan v. Security Lumber Co., 423 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. 1967).
"TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5459 (1958).
" University Say. & Loan v. Security Lumber Co., 423 S.W.2d 287, 296 (Tex. 1967).
s It seems noteworthy that the Chief Justice remarked that "the problem is primarily one
of proper interpretation of the applicable statutes, not one of policy or of equities." Id. at 293. His
opinion concluded, however, with the statement that "giving the lien priority is in accord with
our long-standing rule of liberal construction for protection of laborers and materialmen who
by their contribution added to the value of the security for the deed of trust debt." Id. at 296.
Justice Norvell, on the other hand, commented that "in the absence of statutory wording com-
pelling such result [the majority's holding] ... the greater good lies with the security of land
titles and the certainty of financial obligations." Id. at 297.
33428 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
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including wall sections, window units, outside door units, roofs and wall
sheeting for several buildings, all of which were installed on the concrete
slab already in place. A prior deed of trust securing the construction loan
had been filed of record. The owner of the property repudiated the agree-
ment with the supplier, who then filed mechanic's lien affidavits. After a
default under the construction loan, the deed of trust lien was foreclosed
and the property sold by the trustee. Although admitting that the deed
of trust lien had priority, the supplier sought to foreclose his mechanic's
lien as to the improvements he supplied. The court of civil appeals allowed
the supplier to foreclose his mechanic's lien on all of the building materials
above the concrete foundation on the property. Although acknowledging
that the evidence was conflicting as to whether or not such improvements
could be removed without material injury to the property, the court con-
cluded that the evidence was "legally and factually sufficient" to support
the jury finding. To determine the "factual" sufficiency in light of the
conflicting evidence the court relied chiefly on Wallace Gin Co. v. Burton-
Lingo Co., 4 in which a lumber company furnished materials for the
construction of a cotton house on property having a gin and other separate
improvements already constructed thereon; the lumber company was per-
mitted to foreclose its lien and sell the cotton house, even though there
was a prior deed of trust lien covering the property. However, application
of Wallace Gin Co. to the facts in Parkdale State Bank seems questionable.
The foreclosure and sale of a cotton house on property having substantial
other improvements (particularly when the deed of trust was not given
to secure a construction loan for the cotton house) would cause little or
no material injury to the property (and thus the security for the loan).
But the foreclosure and sale of the components of a building, leaving only
the concrete foundation, on property covered by a deed of trust securing
the construction loan for the building would seem materially to affect the
value of the property.
Time of Filing Claim. In General Air Conditioning Co. v. Third Ward
Church of Christ" a subcontractor filed a lien claim because the general
contractor failed to pay for the work. The owner had promptly paid the
general contractor upon completion of the work and thus failed to retain
the ten per cent for thirty days as required by article 5469. The subcon-
tractor gave the owner notice of the claim within thirty days after the
work was completed (the time period under article 5469) ; however, the
lien claim affidavit was not filed (and therefore the lien was not perfected)
within the thirty-day period, but was filed within ninety days after the
indebtedness accrued (the time period under article 5453). The supreme
court held that because the owner did not retain the ten per cent lien
claimant's fund as required by article 5469, the general article (article
5453) providing for a ninety-day filing period controlled. Thus the sub-
contractor was entitled to a recovery and a lien against the owner's
34 104 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
"5426 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. 1968).
1969]
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property to the extent of the ten per cent fund. The court appears to
treat this result as self-evident, offering no explanation other than refer-
ences to the statutory provisions. Article 5469 speaks to the circumstance
in which the owner has failed to retain the ten per cent fund by never-
theless making the owner liable for ten per cent; but the article does not
suggest that a different filing period is required in order to perfect the
lien in the event the owner fails to retain the ten per cent fund. In this
case, the result is perhaps justifiable in that the materialman gave notice
to the owner within the thirty-day period; thus, if the owner had retained
the ten per cent fund for thirty days the supplier would have been paid.
If the courts will limit such a construction of article 5469 to these circum-
stances the current business practices in the construction industry will be
only mildly affected. If such a construction is extended to include other
circumstances (for example, where both the notice is given and the lien
affidavit filed after the thirty-day period) dislocation would follow (not
only to contractors and subcontractors, but also to lenders and title com-
panies) and a prudent owner would withhold ten per cent for a full ninety
days after the work is completed. In the example, it would make no dif-
ference if the owner withheld or paid the ten per cent fund during the
thirty-day period since the notice and lien were filed after this period.
IV. PROPERTY DESCRIPTIONS
In contracting for the purchase and sale or lease of large tracts of un-
developed property, a survey or a metes and bounds description is often
unavailable at the time the contract or lease is made. Frequently, time is of
the essence in getting the documents executed, and little attention is paid
to the accuracy of the property description. The case law in Texas is clear
that the document must furnish within itself, or by reference to some
other existing writing, the means or data by which the property may be
identified with reasonable certainty. An incomplete description of the
property, if accompanied by the use of such words as "my property,"
"my land," or "owned by me," is sufficient if the owner owns only one
tract of property answering the description."6
The importance of an adequate property description is underscored in
two recent civil appeals cases. In one," a real estate broker obtained a
written listing agreement for property described as "approximately 40
acres out of the Ritson-Morris Survey, in Harris County, Texas, adjacent
to Wildwood Additions." A contract was entered into describing the
property as 39 acres, more or less (being part of tracts originally contain-
ing 76.849 acres, describing the deed) out of the Ritson-Morris Survey,
"lying west of the channel or slough opening into Clear Lake." Also in-
cluded were a number of undeveloped lots in Wildwood Additions, "and
all other right, title and interest of seller, whether now owned or here-
after acquired before the date of closing hereof, in and to land and im-
3SSee Pickett v. Bishop, 148 Tex. 207, 223 S.W.2d 222 (1949).
"Mauro v. Wildwood Co., 426 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error rel. n.r.e.
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provements located in the Ritson-Morris Survey ... and lands lying adja-
cent to the lands described . . . above and underlying roads, easements and
said channel or slough." Subsequently, a survey revealed that the property
actually consisted of several tracts, including a 2.58-acre tract not adjoin-
ing Wildwood Addition. The contract was not consummated, and the
broker sued for his commission. The court questioned whether or not the
parties intended to include the 2.58-acre tract, the lots in Wildwood Addi-
tion, and all or only part of the tracts adjoining Wildwood Addition. The
court concluded that the description was uncertain and indefinite and
that "there was no manner in which the specific property to be sold could
be determined in this case from the written listing agreement and from
the property on the ground." 8
In the other case" the owner employed a real estate salesman to sell
tracts located in and near a town. A notice, signed by the owner and
addressed "To All Salesmen," was delivered, setting forth the amount and
manner of payment of the commission. The salesman sold tracts of property
and sued for the commission. The owner contended, and the court held,
that the suit was barred by section 28 of article 6573a,' which provides
that no action may be maintained for recovery of any commission for the
sale of real estate unless the agreement is in writing and signed by the party
sought to be charged. The court observed that the notice was insufficient
because it neither contained any description of the property nor referred
to another writing containing a description of the property. The court
acknowledged that the salesman was an employee and was employed to
sell the owner's property exclusively, but remarked that it "would have
to rewrite Sec. 28 of Article 6573a in order to include exceptions based
on such facts."'" No rewriting would have been required if the court had
viewed the case merely as a suit to recover wages due an employee. The
wages are measured by a percentage of the sales price of property sold by
the employee and thus are parallel to a "commission" when an independent
agent is involved. It would not seem that the policy of section 28, article
6573a is enhanced by covering the employer-employee context.
V. AD VALOREM TAXES
The Texas Supreme Court considered for the first time in many years
the question of what types of charitable institutions are statutorily exempt
from ad valorem taxes.' Hilltop Village, Inc., a non-profit corporation
organized for the purpose of providing a home for older adults, filed a
declaratory judgment suit, seeking an exemption from the ad valorem
tax on the basis that it was a purely public charity. The bylaws of the
home stipulate that there is no admission fee "but those who are finan-
cially able to pay for the cost of their care shall be expected to do so ....
'lid. at 327.
39 Jennings v. Lee, 430 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.40
TEx. REv. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 28 (1960).
41 430 S.W.2d at 239.
42 Hilltop Village, Inc. v. Kerrville Independent School Dist., 426 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. 1968).
1969]
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In any case, admission will be a matter of negotiation and mutual agree-
ment and each case will be considered on its own merit."" The bylaws
further provide that, in cases where a member of the home is unable to
pay for the cost of his care, the administration of the home has authority to
apply for financial help or "may provide such member with funds . . .""
The evidence showed that twenty-two per cent of the residents of the
home received some charity in varying amounts and that the others paid
for the full cost of their care. The home also operated a canteen, candy
and cigarette vending machines, and a beauty shop, from which it received,
at most, a nominal income. Despite the fact that the income from the
residents was supplemented by voluntary contributions and donations,
the home had operated at a substantial loss since its organization.
In reaching its decision, the supreme court concluded that in order for
an institution to qualify for the statutory exemption, there must be a
dedication of the property to charitable uses accompanied by actual uses
for such purposes.' After finding no Texas case law precedents on this
issue involving a home for the aged, the court examined cases from other
states and discovered a conflict. The decisions recognizing the tax exemp-
tion, the court noted, rested principally upon the theory that elderly
adults have special care and residential requirements, the alleviation of
which is of social value. The decisions denying exemption emphasized that
the elderly adults of the home were the principal beneficiaries, rather than
society in general, and that society was not relieved of responsibility for
such persons. The court stressed that the home's facilities were available
primarily to those who are able to pay and that the home did not accept
residents without a consideration of their financial circumstances. More-
over, the bylaws of the home did not bind the home to accept charitable
obligations or to engage in dispensing relief to those in need. The court
concluded:
[T]he requisite elements of dedication and use in fact of its properties are
not present. There is no assurance that society is being or will be relieved
of the care and expense of those in need. This is not to say that all residents
must be indigent or that the acceptance of payment from some will defeat
tax exemption. It is to say that the institution must be one whose properties
and assets are pledged in perpetuity to the relief of persons in financial need
and to their assistance in obtaining the care they must have to prevent their
becoming a burden to society.
Justices Pope and Norvell dissented, observing that the charter of the
home "dedicates all of the property and funds of the home to charitable
purposes from inception until final distribution upon the dissolution of
the corporation.""7 The dissenters noted that, if the bylaws lacked a dedi-
cation to charitable purposes, such a defect easily could have been cured
by amendments to the charter and bylaws to provide for such dedication.
43 1d. at 945.
44 Id.




The dissenters noted that in Santa Rosa Infirmary v. City of San Antonio,"8
which the majority had relied upon as the Texas case establishing the
guidelines, fourteen per cent of the patients of the hospital were charity
patients; moreover, the hospital made a profit but used the profit for
further services, whereas the home in Hilltop made no profit and twenty-
two per cent of its members were charity cases.
VI. EASEMENTS AND DEDICATIONS
Lateral Support for Easement. In San Jacinto Sand Co. v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co.49 the telephone company secured an easement thirty
feet in width and laid two eight-inch pipes for cables beneath the ease-
ment area. The telephone company then began laying a new twelve-inch
inter-city cable that would result in discontinuing the use of the two
eight-inch pipes. A sand and gravel company, which owned the land ad-
joining the easement, was excavating sand and gravel on another tract of
land nearby and began preparing the adjoining tract for excavations.
The telephone company sued for a temporary injunction prohibiting
excavations resulting in damage to the cables and for a declaration of its
rights to lateral and/or subjacent support respecting its easement. The
trial court granted the application for the temporary injunction and pre-
scribed the boundaries within which no excavation could be conducted.
The court of civil appeals held that the language in the grant of easement
authorizing the telephone company to reconstruct or rerun cables as it
required from time to time permitted the installation of the larger pipe."
The court admitted that granting relief to either party would cause the
other to suffer loss, but concluded that "the equities and legal rights of
the parties are clear.""1
In determining equitable rights, the court emphasized the vital role
played by the transportation and communications systems and their de-
pendence upon the "integrity" of easements. Although this tribute to the
communications and transportation systems seems beside the point in
resolving the case, it illustrates the court's sensitivity to the interest of
the public under such circumstances (for example, the higher costs of
installing an alternative cable line would mean ultimately higher tariffs
for users).
Abandonment of Prior Dedication. In a time of spiraling land values,
property developers frequently seek to transform the use of property from
48 259 S.W. 926 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924), judgment adopted.
49426 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
" The court thus distinguished this case from Houston Pipe Line Co. v. Dwyer, 374 S.W.2d
662 (Tex. 1964), in which the grant of easement deleted the word "remove" from its enumera-
tion of the rights of the easement holder.
5' 426 S.W.2d at 345. As to the equitable rights, the court remarked that "the tremendous
transportation and communications system servicing the state are dependent upon the integrity
of these easements. Many of the streets, roads and highways of the state are built on easements.
The distribution of electric power is dependent upon easements as is practically all telephone
service. Pipelines and railroads generally rely entirely on easements. Under the view taken by
appellant, these interests in land would be potentially reduced to mere licenses at will." Id.
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low density housing to higher density housing, either by changing the
zoning classification or by securing the abandonment of a prior dedication.
Demonstrating the abandonment of a prior dedication has generally been
a difficult task. In Smith v. Williams2 the owners of several lots within a
subdivision were threatened by the construction of apartments on nearby
property and sought a declaratory judgment that single-family residential
restrictions imposed by a 1946 dedication of an addition were still in force.
The original plat and dedication of the addition provided for thirty-six
large lots, imposed restrictions as to floor space and cost, and required the
dedicators' approval of any structures. From time to time, various of the
lots comprising the original addition were subdivided and rededicated so as
to increase the number of lots. A portion of one lot was conveyed by deed
in which the grantor waived the restrictions imposed by the original dedi-
cation. This portion was later rezoned for apartment use and was then
rededicated for use either for single-family residential or apartment pur-
poses. However, many of the persons who were then owners of lots com-
prising the original addition did not join in the rededication. The supreme
court held that the subsequent rededications" "completely emasculated"
the original dedication.
VII. WARRANTIES IN CONSTRUCTION
The question of the applicability of the doctrine of caveat emptor to
the construction and sale of buildings was considered by the supreme
court in Humber v. Morton.4 After the owner purchased a new house
from a builder-seller, the house caught fire and partially burned, allegedly
because of a defectively constructed fireplace. The house was sold with no
express warranties except as to title. The supreme court held that a builder-
seller impliedly warrants that the house "was constructed in a good work-
manlike manner and was suitable for human habitation."' After a
thorough review of the national pattern of "the rapid sickening of the
caveat emptor doctrine,"'" the court concluded that the doctrine as applied
to new houses is an anachronism. It thus appears that Texas has finally
fallen in line with other states in further eroding the caveat emptor doc-
trine.
In Humber, the court reviewed a Colorado case" in which the builder-
52422 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1967).
" The court observed that the other rededications, although not shifting from single-family
residential to apartment use, substantially departed from the original plan. The court specifically
noted the following changes: the number of lots was increased from 66 to 640; the minimum
cost requirement was abandoned; and street locations and easements were changed. From these
facts, the court observed, "it is reasonable to conclude that those who executed each rededication
intended to abandon the 1946 (original) dedication as to the property then rededicated and to
waive any right to enforce its restrictions .... " Id. at 173. Another condition in the original
dedication prohibited the sale of lots to anyone not of the white race. The court stated in a
footnote: "As to the enforceability of this restriction, see Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1." Id.
at 173 n.2.
54426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
5 4 2 6 S.W.2d at 5s5.51Id. at 558.
"Carpenter v. Donahoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
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seller contracted to sell the house after the construction was complete.
The court remarked that "while it is not necessary for us to pass upon a
situation in which the vendor-purchaser relationship is absent, the [Colo-
rado] case ... is important as much of the reasoning set forth in the
opinion is applicable here."'" A Texas court of civil appeals in Polk Ter-
race Inc. v. Curtis," however, indicated that there is no warranty of fitness
and suitability in the sale of a house. Since Polk apparently did not involve
a builder-seller, it remains to be seen whether or not the implied warranty
will be extended to subsequent sales of improved property.
In another warranty case,60 a court of civil appeals was called on to
determine whether or not the typical one-year contractual warranty pre-
cluded recovery for latent defects which did not appear within the one-
year period. The city of Midland sued a general contractor and surety
company to recover damages for breach of contract for the construction of
a swimming pool. The contract incorporated the A.I.A. Standard Contract
Documents, providing that the contractor guarantees the work for one
year from the date of acceptance and further that the architect's certificate
of completion does not relieve the contractor of his express warranties
nor his duty to correct defective work. The general conditions also dele-
gate to the architect the final authority to decide all questions as to the
quality and acceptability of the material furnished and work performed.
Approximately twenty months after the pool was completed and a cer-
tificate of acceptance signed by the city's architect, defects due to faulty
construction of the pool were discovered. Recognizing the conflict between
the provisions of the general conditions, the supreme court held:
[L]atent defects at the time the architect issued his final certificate of pay-
ment and accepted his premises, becoming evident after the one-year war-
ranty contained in the contract and which could not have been discovered
by the exercise of ordinary care, may be made the basis of a suit for damages
on account of such defects. . . .The architect's final certificate is binding
on all parties as to the actual physical final completion of the work ...
Insofar as defects are concerned which are unknown and could not have
been discovered by ordinary care, the four-year statute of limitations applies.0'
Thus, a contractor who thought he had given a one-year warranty dis-
covered a latent defect in his contract extending his warranty to four years.
VIII. EMINENT DOMAIN
The recent development of the Texas law of eminent domain certainly
must be described as "evolutionary" rather than "revolutionary." No
startling concepts were introduced, and the cases serve largely as re-
minders of previously established legal principles.
Only two supreme court decisions are worthy of note, State v. Zaruba'
"0426 S.W.2d at 559.
59422 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
00City of Midland v. Waller, 430 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. 1968).
61 id. at 478.
6a 418 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. 1967).
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and Brunson v. State.3 Zaruba reminds the condemnee and his attorneys
that, when land occupied for business purposes is taken, the damage to
the established business or "good will" is not compensable as a separate,
independent item of recovery. The court held that the condemnee had
obviously included the value of his business as a "going concern" in
valuing the whole of his property before the taking; since his opinion was
founded on an improper measure of valuation, it was of no probative
force and could not support the jury finding of damages to the remainder.
Brunson arose out of the taking of an easement for highway right-of-way
purposes. The state sued for conversion of a trailer house and other im-
provements which were located on the right-of-way at the time of the
condemnation judgment but subsequently removed by the condemnee.
The condemnation judgment was silent as to the disposition of the im-
provements, and the court held that in such a case "the ownership of the
landowner in improvements which are a part of the realty, and his right
to remove them, will be enforced.""
Two decisions by courts of civil appeals further eroded the doctrine
announced in Tennessee Gas & Transmission Co. v. Zirjack-s5 that one
seeking damages to the remainder must show the nature of the damage and
its relationship to value. Lip service is paid to the principle of Zirjacks,
but the effect of City of Houston v. McFadden" and Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co. v. Griffin"7 is to minimize the importance of a witness's
being able to pinpoint the "how" and "why" of damages to the remainder
in the sense of explaining the dollar value attached to the damages allegedly
caused by the taking.
Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement District No. 1 v. Hub-
bard"8 reminds the condemnor to plead enhancement of value as a result of
special benefit from the taking as an offset to damages to the remainder
(but, of course, never as a reduction in value of the part actually taken).
The court of civil appeals upheld the trial court's refusal to permit the
condemnor to file a trial amendment asserting special enhancement.
Two cases on valuation are worth reading as examples of the degree
to which the appellate courts will go to support the trial court's findings
of value. In Brazos River Authority v. Gilliam,"5 the court upheld a sub-
stantial award for ranch land valued as gravel land over the condemnor's
03418 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. 1967).
14Id. at 507.
65 244 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951), error dismissed.
60420 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e. McFadden involved damages
arising out of low-flying jets; the landowner's expert witness depreciated the value of the property
by fifty per cent but gave no specific reasons "how" and "why." The court concluded, "It is not
for this court to discredit Mr. Weiss' testimony because he failed to give detailed reasons for his
conclusions .... " 420 S.W.2d at 815.
67429 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). In Griffin the court followed State v. Scarbrough,
383 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), error ref., and McFadden and distinguished Zirjacks.
The court pointed out that, if there is probative evidence of specific ways in which the remainder
is damaged, the testimony of the expert witness as to value "before" and "after" need not go
into detailed reasons to support the opinion of value.
'8426 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
"9429 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
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contention that the Cannizzo" doctrine should apply. It was undisputed
that no gravel operations had ever been conducted and there was no evi-
dence that such operations would be conducted within a reasonable time.
The court held that sand and gravel underlying condemned land partakes
of the nature of realty and that evidence of its value is proper without
regard to plans for mining or use. The principle is no doubt correct, but
its application to the facts of this case is a little dubious.
State v. Walker"' is a classic example of how the state (and hence the
taxpayers) sometimes "gets it coming and going." Here the property taken
was a strip 50 feet by 180 feet off the front of a tract 150 feet by 180
feet. The Texarkana court of civil appeals upheld the trial court's judg-
ment of $47,652 for the 9,000 square feet taken and simultaneously upheld
a finding that the remaining 18,000 square feet had a value after the tak-
ing of only $30,500 (and thus awarded $18,850 for damages to the re-
mainder). The court advanced the following rationale for the seemingly
large award on the part taken: "Such facts are self evident that a willing
buyer would pay more per square foot of the land fronting on the high-
way ... ."" This assertion is correct but the court overlooked the same
"self-evident" fact that after the front one-third is severed the property
behind it becomes frontage, and thus special enhancement to the remainder
would seem to have appeared almost as a matter of law. Perhaps the
state failed to plead enhancement.
Three more rounds of the Dupuy73 and Archenhold"4 cases unfolded and
it appears that a veritable flood of cases in this area can be expected. Two
cases followed Dupuy and held that reasonable access had been impaired
by public works activity not involving direct physical taking of or injury
to the property. 5 In the most significant case, City of Houston v. Fox,7
the majority held that the owner had a private easement over abutting
streets and that "construction of the improvement for public use sub-
stantially impaired his right to make use of these private easements. This
is a violation of a legal right distinct from the claimed denial of the right
to ingress and egress.""7 Since the Texas Supreme Court had already reversed
and remanded the case, holding as a matter of law that reasonable access
had not been impaired," it appears likely that the case will be reviewed
and the outcome should be interesting.
'
0 City of Austin v. Cannizzo, 153 Tex. 324, 267 S.W.2d 808 (1954).
7' 430 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error granted.
712 d. at 17.
7
aDupuy v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. 1965).
"
4 Archenhold Auto Supply Co. v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1965).
" City of Waco v. Taxland Corp., 425 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error granted.
76429 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error granted.
77 Id. at 204.71City of Houston v. Fox, 419 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. 1967).
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